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A commentary on
EmbodyingOthers in Immersive Virtual Reality: Electro-Cortical Signatures ofMonitoring the
Errors in the Actions of an Avatar Seen from a First-Person Perspective
by Pavone, E. F., Tieri, G., Rizza, G., Tidoni, E., Grisoni, L., Aglioti, S. M. (2016). J. Neurosci. 36,
268–279. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0494-15.2016
Imagine a situation where you are uncertain if you see yourself, for example on a shady screen
recording. In this situation many people do instinctively the same: e.g., they wave their hands, and
see if that other hand moves the same way. However when you look down yourself instead of the
screen, you simply sense it is your body. The body you feel and the body you see naturally coincide
and gives you a sense that this body right there is yours. It has been suggested that this sense of
voluntarily control (Sense of agency) and the sense that the body I experience is my own (Sense of
ownership) are important contributors to the experience of the self (Gallagher, 2000). Only in rare
occasions we feel the need the check if that body is really me. In those rare moments though the
recognition of an action error, a discrepancy between the intended action and the feedback is an
important process in determining whether that what you see is you or not.
The article by Pavone and colleagues address these issues by using a virtual-reality based setup,
in which participants see an avatar body experienced from the first person perspective (1PP; Pavone
et al., 2016). Using virtual-reality is an elegant method as it allows perfectly aligning the apparent
(visual) position of the avatar body and the (proprioceptively) felt body of the participant. It is
known that the 1PP is a very strong cue for bodily self-recognition (Slater et al., 2010; Petkova et al.,
2011). Next to the participant avatar sits another avatar, and both the participant and the virtual
other sit around a table with cups. Participants received instructions about an upcoming action:
the avatar grasping one of the cups. In the majority of trials the avatar will grasp the cup. However,
sometimes the avatar will not perform the action accurately, and the hand misses the cup. Pavone
and colleagues were interested in how we perceive this situation of an action gone wrong, when
it is performed either by myself or another avatar. They used EEG and focused on two particular
components associated with error monitoring: the ERN and PE. The findings indicate that both
these components reflect error monitoring, but in a more specific manner. The ERN seems specific
to the situation of perceiving an error of me, which is further accompanied by an increase in theta
Kalckert Action Monitoring in Virtual Reality
band power. This is particularly the case in situations in which
participants report a strong illusion. The PE seems less specific
and does not differentiate between an error by myself or
someone else.
Although it is remarkable that there are error mechanisms
responding to both another person and me, I like to draw
attention to the ERN: The observation of a self-specific error
process is very interesting. Whether such a self-specific network
exists in the human brain is not entirely clear (Gillihan and
Farah, 2005; Legrand and Ruby, 2009). Although a number of
studies have suggested areas and networks, which are related
to the self, it is a different question to ask whether these are
also specific. As pointed out by Legrand and Ruby (2009) many
studies investigating the self use self-related stimuli, which are
however not necessarily exclusive to the self. The experience of
the own body asmy body however could meet this criterion. Here
both the sense of ownership and agency can be considered as
important contributors to this experience (Tsakiris et al., 2007;
Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012). The integration of these different
bodily cues, besides others like e.g., interoception, may allow
establishing the experience of having a bodily self, which is
unique to me.
A further observation on ownership and agency deserves
attention, which bears similarity to a previous observation
(Wegner et al., 2004). In a way this experiment is a low-tech
version of the present study. An experimenter stood behind
the participants and stretched out the arms, so participants
see the experimenter’s arms as if these are the own arms.
Participants heard instructions, which indicated the upcoming
actions. The experimenter then performed actions, like wave your
hand. Interestingly participants felt a sense of control over those
hands, when there is a match between the instruction and the
action, even in the absence of any movements by themselves.
When the experimenter snapped a rubber band on those hands,
so inflicting a painful stimulus, participant’s GSR showed an
increased response. This suggests that this (indirect) feeling of
control in combination with a 1PP may also result in a residual
sense of ownership (participants however did not report strong
sensations of ownership). In the present study we see significantly
higher ownership ratings in those trials, in which the action was
correctly executed. So, being able to preview the action led to
a stronger ownership sensation. Some recent studies raise the
possibility that agency could influence ownership (e.g., Ma and
Hommel, 2015), but at least for rubber hand illusion experiments
this question is not fully resolved yet (Caspar et al., 2015;
Jenkinson and Preston, 2015). It would be interesting to measure
the experience of ownership and agency in these situations to
examine the way both these sensations interact.
In sum, the present study sheds light on the processes
underpinning the experience of the own body, when confronted
with an action error. These processes, as reflected by the ERN and
increase of theta—power centered on medial-frontal structures,
show specificity for my errors, in contrast to an error committed
by someone else. Self-specific error monitoring may be a critical
aspect of the sense of agency, which should show this specificity
to the own action. Understanding these processes may be a
critical step to elucidate the conscious experience of the own self.
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